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21 January 1959

Copy No. C 63

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

L. DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TO

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

2010

DATE 4-4-80 REVIEWER:

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

TOP SECRET

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less favorable, has decided provisionally to accept a Soffer made last September to supply on credit capital ement for construction of an \$82,000,000 oil refinery in New Delhi has also requested complete Soviet technical sistance in building and operating the refinery, and is ing Moscow's response. Agreement on this project, for ing contracts in October with Rumania for construction government—owned refinery in Assam, would assure the viet bloc an important role in expanding India's oil india'					capital equip- inery in Bihar. technical as- , and is await- oject, follow- struction of a assure the So-	
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC No Back-up Material

II. ASIA-AFRICA
Iran Reported Considering Nonaggression Pact With USSR
The Shah of Iran is seriously considering a 50-year nonaggression pact with the USSR. The USSR, which proposed the pact in late December, demands as a condition that Iran not sign the pending bilateral defense agreement with the United States. A guarantee of Iran's security would be requested from 'five governments, including Great Britain, France, and India.' The USSR would also be prepared to provide Iran with extensive military and economic aid.
The Iranian Government would require, before signing the pact, that the USSR cancel articles 5 and 6 of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 which gives the USSR the right to advance its troops into Iran to carry out operations "necessary for its defense" when menaced by military operations of another country.
The Shah is disappointed with the limited success of his campaign over the last few months to obtain increased US support for Iran and the Baghdad Pact. He claims that the draft bilateral

While the Shah's consideration of Soviet offers could be a further extension of tactics to obtain US aid, Ambassador Wailes states that something "ominous" may be pending between Iran and the USSR, but doubts that Iran has yet made a decision which would seriously affect free-world interests. Iranian Foreign Minister Hekmat has warned the ambassador that Iran is "living next door to a beast" and that, while he could give no details now, the US must have "full trust" in its friend Iran and "in the way in which it will deal with the Soviet Union."

agreement offers no additional guarantees to the security of Iran.

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
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25X1 Israel Urges Opposition to Nasir's Influence in Iraq Israel is showing increased concern over the possibility that the United States, as well as Iran and Turkey, might support Nasir while opposing Communist influence in Iraq. The Israelis fear the extension of Nasir's influence to Iraq would bring about unification of the Arab world and increase the Arab threat to Israel's security. Israel argues that the West should instead support Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim's resistance to Nasir and pro-UAR elements in Iraq. According to Israeli Ambassador Eban, Nasir is the cause of, rather than the remedy for, Qasim's acceptance of Communist support, and Qasim would assume a more truly independent position if he had non-Communist support against UAR pressure. 25X1

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Spanish Aid to Moroccan Dissidents	25X1
Spanish involvement in the tribal dissidence in northern Morocco may cause Rabat to renew pressure for the evacuation of the 10,000 Spanish troops remaining in Morocco. Rabat has repeatedly protested Spanish complicity.	
Moroccan Vice Premier Bouabid, who with other officials recently inspected military activities in northern Morocco, stated the Royal Army has proof that Spain has supplied arms and money to the Beni Ouriaghel tribe. Bouabid also claimed he has discovered a definite separatist movement in the Rif and that the Beni Ouriaghel—the tribe of Riffian warrior Abd-el-Krim who rebelled against Spain in the 1920s—apparently are determined to set up a Rif republic.	
The Spanish ambassador in Rabat has admitted that some assistance to the Moroccan tribes may have come from local Spanish sources, but he has denied that Spain intends to make war on Morocco.	25X1
The Spanish military governor of Melilla, one of five tiny Spanish-controlled points in northern Morocco, is reported to have granted asylum to Berber leader Lahcen Lyoussi, a former crown counselor who is being sought by government forces for involvement in tribal dissidence,	25X1
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India to Accept Soviet Offer to Help Build Oil Refinery

Soviet bloc participation in India's expanding oil industry is likely to be broadened substantially as a result of a provisional decision by the Indian cabinet to accept Moscow's offer of last September to help build a major oil refinery in Bihar State in eastern India. Soviet credit for capital equipment probably will cover a large share of the project's estimated \$82,000,000 cost. In addition New Delhi has requested Soviet technical assistance in constructing and operating the refinery. Moscow apparently has not yet responded to this request.

The project in Bihar is the larger of two refineries planned by the Indian Government to exploit oil deposits in northeastern India and to expand the public sector of the petroleum industry. Last October New Delhi signed an agreement with Rumania for construction of a refinery in Assam with a capacity of 750,000 tons annually.

The Indian Government early in 1958 requested the USSR and Western oil companies to consider assisting in the construction of the Bihar refinery, which will have a probable annual capacity of 2,000,000 tons. British, Italian, and American firms have expressed interest in the project, but their various proposals were turned down by New Delhi, apparently because they demanded special concessions or offered less favorable credit terms. Most US companies are reluctant to invest in state-owned enterprises that will compete with privately owned refineries now operating in India.

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III. THE WEST

Some Key Members of New Cuban Government Becoming Disillusioned

The tendency in the new Cuban Government to refer all governmental and military decisions to Fidel Castro is seriously slowing down government operations and causing responsible high officials to become increasingly frustrated and disillusioned. Provisional President Urrutia is said to refer all decisions to Castro, who has been almost completely occupied with public appearances. In the armed forces, subordinate commanders are unable to make even minor decisions without referring them to Castro. As commander in chief, Castro intends personally to reorganize the armed forces, a process that is expected to be slow.

Prime Minister Jose Miro Cardona, highly regarded lawyer whose membership in the government has done much to lend it prestige, on 19 January submitted a letter of resignation which several influential Cubans are trying to get him to withdraw. Though his alleged reason was his poor health, the basic reason is understood by the American Embassy to be frustration over the inefficiency of government operations.

Miro Cardona is further angered at Castro's attacks on the United States since the criticism of the summary executions of Batista "war criminals." Cardona and another cabinet member have urged Castro to exercise more restraint in his speeches and, on 18 January, at least two Havana newspapers stressed the need for more calm and less talk.

Education Minister Armando Hart is also reported to be seriously considering resigning. If this trend continues, public confidence in the government will be seriously shaken and a period of political instability will ensue.

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Special Adviser to the President

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

